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ETHIOPIA: A DICHOTOMY OF DESPAIR AND HOPE
Kimberly Medlock Wigger
I. INTRODUCTION
The mention of Ethiopia generally evokes images of drought, famine
and poverty. The world became all too familiar with these aspects of
Ethiopia in the mid-1980's when starving children with swollen stomachs
and match stick arms stared forlornly into television cameras with their
huge eyes.' These distressing scenes were not solely attributable to the
fact that Ethiopia had suffered a drought. These images were the result of
years of ineffective governmental rule. Ultimately this ineffective rule
had a catastrophic effect on the way Ethiopians were able to react to a
drought situation. This paper discusses the political and economic history
that has created present-day Ethiopia; the changes needed in Ethiopia to
create an environment of sustained growth; and the role of the United
States in enhancing economic and social development in Ethiopia.
One underlying current of the humanitarian disaster that plagued
Ethiopia was the impact of tribal hostility. The people of Ethiopia have
historically been divided along ethnic lines for ruling purposes. Differ-
ences between the ethnic groups have generally been settled by resorting
to political violence.3 This violence is an obstacle to unifying the country
and has often been the impetus for creating a flow of refugees into sur-
rounding countries.
The most compelling cause of Ethiopia's hardships is the detrimental
impact of the imperialistic and socialist regimes which ruled the country
prior to 1991. The imperialistic form of government stifled economic and
social progress, even when policies were offered under the guise of re-
form. The socialist form of government strangled progress with its eco-
1. See Otto Friedrich, Does Helping Really Help? The West's Dilemma: Aid to the
Starving May Benefit Those Who Made Them Starve, TIME, Dec. 21, 1987, at 44.
2. See Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon Unity, Human
Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
3. Assefaw Bariagaber, Political Violence and the Uprooted in the Horn of Africa: A
Study of Refugee Flows From Ethiopia, J. BLACK STUD., Sept. 1997, at 30.
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nomic policies of state-owned businesses. The Ethiopia that survived
these regimes is a country that has fought back in the face of adversity,
but whose future is questionable as to economic and social progress.
Is it a contradiction to label Ethiopia a "land of opportunity?" Deep
in the earth of this landlocked country 4 lies a vastness of mineral re-
sources that have remained untouched. There is a wealth of human re-
sources waiting to be molded into a productive workforce. There is also a
multitude of potential trade and investment opportunities that await ad-
venturous investors. These opportunities have come about largely through
the government's transition to a free-market economy. Critics warn that
this transition may be "too little, too late" to pull Ethiopia out of the so-
cial and economic quagmire that past government regimes have pro-
duced.
II. HISTORY
A. King of Kings: Menelik 11
Ethiopia, one of Africa's oldest nations,6 has some of the world's
most rugged and beautiful scenery.7 Against this scenic backdrop, a tale
of epic proportions is revealed. Ethiopia's genesis can be traced to the
kingdom of Aksum,s which was an Ethiopian city-state.9 The Zagwe Dy-
nasty, ruled for 135 years,10 until it was toppled in 1270.11 Ruling power
was then dispersed among a number of small kingdoms for almost 400
years until Menelik II became emperor in 1889 and reunified many of the
small kingdoms.'
2
. Menelik II was interested in modernizing Ethiopia. He assessed what
methods would enable him to achieve this while retaining his power over
the country. His reign began when a treaty was reached with Italy in
4. ETHIOPIA: Review 1997, AFR. REv. WORLD INFO., Feb. 1, 1997.
5. See id.
6. See 6 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 377 (1994).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., PuB. No. 10363, 1996 POST REPORT. ETHIOPIA 1 (1996)
[hereinafter ETHIOPIA].
8. According to the World Book Encyclopedia:
The Aksum Kingdom, the first important state in what is now Ethiopia, was well established
by the A.D. 200's. Wealth was attained through trade with Arabia, Egypt, Greece, India,
Persia, and Rome. The Aksumites exported gold, ivory, and spices. In the height of power in
the 300's, Christianity was designated the official religion. The Muslims gained control of
Arabia, the Red Sea, and the coast of Northern Africa in the 600's, thus, diminishing Ak-
sum's power. As religious enemies of Christian Aksum, the Muslims put an end to the king-
dom's foreign trade.
WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 381.
9. See EDMOND J. KELLER, REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA 16 (1988).
10. See id. at 17.
11. Seeid.atl7-18.
12. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 381.
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which the Italians recognized Menelik II as King of Kings. 13 The Italians
agreed to let Ethiopia have duty-free access to the Red Sea via the Italian
port of Massawa in exchange for a cessation of part of the Tigre high-
lands.14 On its face, the agreement appeared to be advantageous for both
sides. Problems arose, however, when a difference between the Italian
and Amharic' s drafts was discovered. The Italian version called for
Ethiopia to go through Italy when dealing with diplomatic issues with
other countries while the Amharic version implied that Ethiopia might
simply seek the aid of Italy. 16 This contention made conflict inevitable.
Menelik had no intention of relinquishing any of Ethiopia's sovereignty,
and he had growing concerns over Italy's occupation of territory beyond
agreed upon boundaries.17
The inescapable conflict came to a head in early 1896 when Me-
nelik's army defeated the Italians in the Battle of Adowa.'8 A subsequent
treaty invalidated the prior agreement between Ethiopia and Italy, but
Menelik agreed to allow Italy to retain control of its colony in Eritrea.19
The repercussions of this agreement would prove to be a thorn in Ethio-
pia's side for the next century.
Fresh from his defeat of the Italians, Menelik directed his attention to
domestic policies. He recognized that for Ethiopia to survive, it was im-
perative that gains be made in the areas of political control and stability,
and economic progress and prosperity.20 Menelik built schools, hospitals,
postal and telephone systems, bridges, roads, and even a railroad.2 ' These
efforts were the first signs of an emergent modernizing bureaucratic em-
pire.22 The motivation behinds these efforts, though, was self-serving.
Menelik wanted to ensure that he maintained the "strength, security, and
viability of the Ethiopian state," while maximizing his "extractive capa-
bilities. ' 2
3
13. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 31. Recognition as supreme power was important to
Menelik II since he wished to neutralize the claim of Ras Mengesha who was actually the
heir to the imperial throne. This recognition eliminated any concern that Menelik had about
the Italians entering into any types of agreement with his vassals that might undermine his
power. See id.
14. See id. at 31-32.
15. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 378. Amharic is the official language of Ethiopia.
See id.
16. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 32.
17. See id. at 33.
18. Seeid. at34.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 36.
21. Seeid. at41.
22. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 36.
23. MULATU WUBNEH & YAHANNIS ABATE, ETHIOPIA: TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT
1998] ETHOPIA
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Menelik died in 1913 and was succeeded by his grandson, Lij Yasu,
as emperor.24 Lij Yasu was not a popular emperor and was succeeded by
his aunt, Princess Zauditu, in February 1917.25 Zauditu's reign ended
when she mysteriously died two days after her husband was killed trying
to defend her control as Empress.26 The next successor to the throne, Ras
Tafari, was crowned Emperor Haile Selassie I (Power of the Trinity) in
November 1930.27
B. Haile Selassie's Reign
Haile Selassie desired to continue Menelik's policy of modernizing
Ethiopia, and he wanted to ensure that his position of power was pre-
served. He gave the country its first written constitution in 1931. 28 The
constitution was clear in establishing Ethiopia as a constitutional monar-
chy which would be guided by imperialistic rule.29 The constitution cre-
ated quasi-representative legislative institutions to promote a picture of
democracy, but it was clear that the authority of the emperor was abso-
lute.3
0
Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and Haile Selassie fled to Great Brit-
ain.3 1 The Italian occupation was brief, yet long enough to create both
positive, economic impacts and unfortunate social results. The Italians
improved Ethiopia's infrastructure by building many roads, and they sig-
nificantly affected commerce and trade.32 Their occupation took its toll,
though, on Ethiopian society. Italian atrocities took the lives of thousands
of Ethiopians, including many in the small educated class.33 This carnage
continued until Haile Selassie defeated the Italians in 1941 with the help
of British forces.
34
Haile Selassie recognized that the weakened state of Ethiopia created
an opportunity for him to reestablish his own bureaucracy on firmer
footing. He developed a new system of local administration consisting of
fourteen major provinces, and governors replaced the nobility as the chief
administrators of each province. 35 The nobility's role in the hierarchy of
iN THE HORN OF AFRICA 18 (1988).
24. See id. at 42.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 43.
27. See id.
28. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 381.
29. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 69.
30. See id. at 70-71.
31. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 381.
32. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 18.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 19.
35. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 74-75.
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power was diminished and its exercise of independent authority was ef-
fectively imited.36 This approach replaced traditional elites in positions
of power withrofessional bureaucrats with no real personal base of po-
litical support. °3 The product of this approach was an inefficient admini-
stration. Administrative decisions which were made autonomously by the
aristocracy of the province now had to be channeled through the Ministry
of Interior of the emperor's bureaucracy.
38
Haile Selassie's strategy to attaining absolutist power also required
the manipulation of two valuable resources: the military and a new edu-
cated class. He needed a strong military to keep domestic order and a
loyal civil service to continue modernization as he defined it.3 9 When the
British government withdrew its military aid to Ethiopia in 1952, Haile
Selassie quickly initiated relations with the United States. American
military aid was effective in strengthening his ability to use his military
as a flexible resource at the disposal of the absolutist state.
40
Haile Selassie's desire to strengthen his bureaucracy by utilizing the
talents of the educated class ultimately had a diluting effect on his power.
He began venturing outside the aristocracy to recruit individuals to fill
positions in the rapidly expanding bureaucracy. 41 Many of the early ad-
vancements to top positions consisted of educated, non-aristocratic indi-
viduals who studied abroad prior to 1936.42 This class of individuals be-
came known as "the new nobility" and came to be resented by the
younger educated elites.43 By the mid-1950's the younger class labeled
the regime as evasive, conservative, and more interested in retaining
power than in bringing about change. 44 These observations were not un-
founded. The younger class, while attending school abroad, was able to
view Ethiopia from an external perspective. They returned and expressed
concern that Ethiopia, in spite of its independence, 45 lagged far behind
36. The nobility had governing power over the traditional provinces. They were an as-
sorted group of political leaders and bureaucrats made up of close relatives of the emperor,
high dignitaries of the imperial court, individuals with senior positions in the government,
either through personal status or palace connections, provincial elites, and high-ranking
military officers. "The emperor was able to curb the power of the nobility by introducing
legislation that defined the powers and responsibilities of the various ministries .
WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 18
37. See KELLE-R, supra note 9, at 75.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 78.
40. Seeid. at81.
41. See id.
42. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 81-82.
43. See id. at 83.
44. See id.
45. See id. "Although Ethiopia could boast of never having been colonized by a European
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other African colonies in the areas of social and economic development.
46
This divisive conflict threatened Haile Selassie's hope for a cohesive bu-
reaucracy.
Haile Selassie's answer to growing criticism 4 was a revised consti-
tution in 1955, the Silver Jubilee of his coronation. 48 The constitution
provided for the formation of four bodies of government and had some
semblance of a separation of power between these institutions.49 This
democratic approach to government was illusory, however. Except for the
membership of the Chamber of Deputies, 50 the emperor selected the
members of the governing bodies. 51 He retained the power to dismiss
members of any of the governing bodies, organize governmental offices
as he saw fit, exercise complete control of the armed forces, and conduct
foreign relations at his discretion.52 The new constitution was no different
from the previous version in that the emperor's power was solidified, not
diluted.
Haile Selassie did gain some support at home and abroad because the
constitution contained various passages relating to civil liberties and
rights.53 These rights included the freedom of religion, freedom of speech
and assembly, and the guarantee that no one could be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. 54 The premise of these
rights may have had Western roots, but Ethiopian remedies were far from
comparable to Western remedies. Many of the rights were granted only
"in accordance with the law" and were subject to a constitutional p5rovi-
sion that placed public order and welfare above individual rights. 5 The
provision was purposefully vague; therefore, it was difficult to challenge
restrictive legislation on constitutional grounds.56
Haile Selassie launched a five-year development plan in 1957,57 yet
power, it was beset by many of the same problems of political and economic underdevelop-
ment that characterized colonized Black Africa." Id.
46. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 33.
47. See id. at 20. The emperor was criticized domestically and internationally for Ethio-
pia's lack of progress in economic and social issue. He was also criticized in the international
arena for Ethiopia's incorporation of Eritrea because Eritrea had an elected governing body.
See id.
48. See id. at 19.
49. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 85.
50. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 19-20. The Chamber of Deputies, who
served as Parliament, was elected by popular vote. See id.
51. See id. at 20.
52. See id.
53. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 86.
54. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 20.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 33.
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the plan was not successful in generating an economic takeoff.58 During
this period rapid industrialization was emphasized, but the emperor's plan
incorporated only a limited role for indigenous entrepreneurs. 59 Haile
Selassie did not want to undermine his power by encouraging the devel-
opment of an autonomous, potentially powerful, new class of elites such
as indigenous business interests.6° He looked to foreign capital to stimu-
late industrialization, but he wanted to ensure that foreign investors re-
mained in check.61 Haile Selassie attempted to do this by manipulating
the requirements to do business within Ethiopia, by diversifying the range
of foreign investors, and by occasionally demanding governmental shares
in a given activity. 62 He passed legislation to make Ethiopia an attractive
investment environment. The legislation granted foreign investors a five-
year tax holiday on profits, a guarantee that a sizable fixed portion of
earned profits could be repatriated, and a duty-free basis to import what-
ever technology or machinery was needed for production.
63
Legislation did not attract foreign investment to Ethiopia's agricul-
tural sector.64 Agriculture, Ethiopia's chief economic activity, lacked the
improvements in equipment, farming methods, marketing, and transpor-
tation needed to increase output.65 The potential was present, but Ethio-
pia's feudal land tenure 66 and its inability to establish clear title to land
deeds were roadblocks to foreign investment. 67 The lack of improvement
in the agricultural sector was greatly highlighted when droughts occurred
in the early 1970's. These droughts resulted in horrific famine which was
the beginning of the unraveling of Ethiopia's bureaucratic empire.
68
Drought was not a new phenomena to Ethiopia, but the costs of
modernization and centralization by the government had taken its tol. 69
58. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 127.
59. See id. at 106.
60. See id. at 107.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 108.
64. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 110.
65- See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 380.
66. According to Keller
Noblemen and bureaucrats were given rist (use rights based on ambilineal
descent) to land on which peasant families were already engaged in cultiva-
tion. These settlers, then were made instant lords with their own estates that
they owned in perpetuity. In addition, those who acquired rist gult (right to
collect dues from the land) privileges could benefit from the labors of vas-
sals permanently assigned to them . . . . In Ethiopia feudalism developed
slowly, never quite maturing to the extent that it resembled classical feudal-
ism.
KELLER, supra note 9, at 57.
67. See id. at 110.
68. See id. at 166.
69. See id.
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Poor rural inhabitants, who in past droughts used surplus production to
survive, were required to provide their surplus to landlords or to the
state.70 Rural peasants had unwittingly become dependent upon the gov-
ernment, yet the government did not initially accept social responsibilities
owed to the peasants. 7 1 Haile Selasse's regime became aware of the po-
tential drought as early as November 1972, but, instead of acting immedi-
ately to avert the impending disaster, it chose to do nothing.
7 2
The drought only affected seven of the fourteen provinces, and sur-
plus production from unaffected areas was available for movement to
areas experiencing shortages. 73 However, no efforts were made to compel
this type of aid. In the interest of increasing foreign exchange, the gov-
ernment began exporting items produced almost exclusively for local
consumption. 74 The exportation of grain continued throughout the
drought and, some grain that had entered the country as relief supplies,
was rebagged and exported.75 There is no proof that this was done with
government complicity but the re-apportionment of relief supplies is an
indication of potential bureaucratic corruption.
76
The horrifying images of Ethiopia's drought-stricken areas were
aired in a documentary by Jonathan Dimbleby in London in the fall of
1973. 77 The revelations of the film shocked European audiences. 78 Relief
began trickling in from various sources, but bureaucratic red tape ham-
pered delivery of supplies to needed locations. 79 The emperor finally vis-
ited the drought-stricken areas in November 1973, but the appalling
sights were not enough to prompt him to increase the amount of aid pro-




Haile Selassie's self-serving motivations and ineptness in handling
Ethiopia's crisis became the ultimate catalysts of his demise. His imperial
myth was destroyed on September 11, 1974, when Dimbleby's film about
the famine was aired on Ethiopian television.82 Scenes were interjected
that depicted the emperor and his guests eating expensive food and
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 166.




77. See id. at 169.
78. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 169.
79. See id. at 170.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 187.
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drinking champagne, and also of him feeding meat to his dogs from a
silver tray.83 Haile Selasse was accused of stashing a fortune away abroad
while thousands starved to death in Ethiopia.84 The emperor was deposed
the next day by the Derg,85 otherwise known as the Armed Forces Coor-
dinating Committee, whose chairman, Mengistu Haile Mariam, ulti-
mately assumed the position of head of state.
86
C. Socialist Rule: The Derg
The Derg, upon assuming power, changed its name to the Provisional
Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and established a provisional
military government.87 The premise of the provisional administration was
to "serve the public good" and to initiate reform to cure the economic and
social ills that imperial rule created.88 Parliament was dissolved, and the
constitution was suspended until a representative body could be elected to
approve a new constitution.89 Ethiopians supported the Derg's actions
because they were relieved to be rid of imperial rule and they believed the
military rule was only temporary. 90
The Derg's temporary power ultimately turned into a 17-year rule
with devastating consequences. The military government adopted social-
istic policies based on Marxism-Leninism l and accepted funding from
the former Soviet Union92 to militarize the country.93 It instituted a large-
scale rural land reform which consisted of breaking up the large estates of
the former nobility and converting the land to state ownership.94 Urban
83. See id.
84. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 46.
85. See id. at 45. The Derg (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and
Territorial Army) evolved from informal meetings of junior and noncommissioned officers
in the military who were displeased with political developments in the country. The Derg
officially came into being on June 28, 1974 with the intention of mounting an opposition to
Haile Selassie's rule. The creation of the Derg rendered the emperor's control of the military
negligible. See id.
86. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 184.
87. See id. at 187.
88. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 51.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Haile, supra note 2, at 5.
92. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 204-205. Financing by the former Soviet Union was
welcomed by the Derg because U.S. President Jimmy Carter significantly reduced military
aid to Ethiopia because of continued gross violations of human rights by the government. In
April 1977 Mengistu demanded that all American installations in the company be closed
down. One hundred American officials and their families were required to exit the country in
a four-day period. See id.
93. See ETHIOPIA, supra note 7, at 2.
94. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 381.
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land and housing was nationalized for the purpose of alleviating the hard-
ships of exorbitant rents facing the urban inhabitants. 95 The government
also instigated social reform efforts. It launched a national literacy cam-
paign, expanded formal educational opportunities and curriculum reform,
and improved the access to modem health care. 96 These policies were
effected at the cost of more than monetary valuations.
Opposition to the Derg's rule occurred even before the dust had set-
tled from the celebrations of the defeat of the emperor. The Derg's refusal
to hold elections after the suspension of the constitution was viewed by
many as a betrayal of the popular uprising that had toppled the emperor's
regime.97 Liberation movements 98 began to form for the purpose of dis-
rupting the Derg's efforts to have its ideology and its rule accepted by the
populace.99 These ideological enemies of the Derg were pursued from
1977 through early 1978 in a purge called .the "red terror," and many
were tortured and/or killed.'10 Civil unrest among the tribes was provoked
by the Derg in an ill-conceived effort to divide and rule the country, and
millions of Ethiopians perished.10t
The military government ultimately degenerated into a dictatorship
led by Mengistu. 102 His regime was ineffective in instigating economic
development through its policies of nationalization of farm land. This was
dramatically demonstrated when Ethiopia had to rely heavily on foreign
aid when it was besieged by more drought and famine between 1984 and
1986.103 This drought, which claimed one million lives by the end of
1986, was far more devastating that the one of 1973-74.104
In an effort to provide long-term relief, the Derg introduced a con-
troversial resettlement policy to relocate approximately 1.5 million peo-
ple from drought-stricken areas in the north to virgin lands in the south.0 5
The government claimed that the policy was strictly for humanitarian
efforts, but critics claimed the main purpose was to depopulate areas
95. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 218.
96. See id. at 219.
97. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 23, at 54.
98. See id. at 54,56. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party (EPRP) formed in 1975.
It later operated in cooperation with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). See id.
99. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 210.
100. See ETHIOPIA, supra note 7, at 2.
101. See Haile, supra note 2, at5.
102. See WUBNEH& ABATE, supra note 23, at 75.
103. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 224-25 ("The crisis stimulated an unprecedented out-
pouring from the public at large in the West .... Even the United States provided millions of
dollars in relief aid to Ethiopia, while consistently criticizing the policies of the Derg."). Id.
104. See id. at 224.
105. See id. at 225.
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where military opposition was prevalent. 106 Criticism of this policy was
not contained within Ethiopia's borders. Some international relief agen-
cies claimed that the Ethiopian government disrupted their efforts to
bring the famine under control by removing drought victims from north-
em feeding centers.1°7 Moreover, many critics claimed that fundamental
human rights were violated because the majority of victims were forced
to leave under duress and were escorted by armed military police. t0
8
The Derg's regime finally collapsed in May 1991 when the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPDF)10 9 advanced on Ad-
dis Ababa' 0and forced Mengistu to flee. 111 A Transitional Government
of Ethiopia (TGE) was established in July 1991 with the support of the
EPRDF, the Oromo Liberation Front, and other liberation movements.
1 2
Despite the relief afforded from the overthrow of the socialist govern-
ment, discord was still present in the transitional government.
D. A Work-in-Progress: Ethiopia's Modern Government
Eritreans voted in May 1993 for independence and seceded from
Ethiopia. 113 This was the culmination of years of civil unrest because of
Eritrea's desire to be an autonomous state. Meanwhile, the TGE was
working to maintain a semblance of a government, and it pledged to
oversee the formation of a multi-party democracy.1 4 It promised freedom
of speech and press, respect for human rights, and a democratic constitu-
tion.115 A new constitution was finally prepared in 1994116 which stressed
ethnic differences rather than suppressing them. 117 This approach gar-
nered many critics. Success based on ethnic federalism is questionable
given Ethiopia's history of ethnic, civil unrest
The new government was also criticized for its lack of acceptance of
opposition parties. Obstacles for parties challenging the EPRDF included:
the detaining of certain leaders, the breaking up of opposition meetings,
106. See id. at 226.
107. Seeid.
108. See id. at226-27.
109. See Federal Sham: Ethiopia, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1997, at 36. The EPRDF was Ti-
grayan, a small ethnic group, which consisted of just seven percent of the population. It could
not feasibly dominate the country which consisted of many ethnic groups. See id.
110. See WORLD BOOK, supra note 6, at 378. Addis Ababa is the capital of Ethiopia.




115. See Haile, supra note 2, at 5.
116. See id.
117. See Federal Sham: Ethiopia, note 110, at 36.
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and the banning of their newspapers." 18 A national election was held in
May 1995, but many opposition parties boycotted the election because of
the unfair advantage of the EPRDF under the leadership of Meles
Zenawi, the prime minister." 19 Zenawi's party assured a win in the elec-
tion through unscrupulous means. Amnesty International reported that
hundreds of opponents to the EPRDF were detained without trial, and
some were tortured and killed. 1
20
Despite claims of human rights violations, Zenawi is regarded as one
of Africa's "new leaders," and he received recognition from the United
States for his advances in government. 12 1 His government has promoted a
free-market approach under the auspices of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank to facilitate economic reform. 122 Economic
improvements have been posted, but are the government's current efforts
enough to sustain growth and progress in Ethiopia?
IT. ETHIOPIA'S ROLE IN ESTABLISHING SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT
Establishing an economic landscape that promotes sustained devel-
opment is contingent on vital reformation within Ethiopia's governmental
walls. Factors for success include the promotion of democracy, l' 3 the
utilization of effective trade policies, 124 the commitment of funds for im-
proving the country's infrastructure, and the promotion of investment
from the private sector. 
126
A. Promotion of Democracy
Ethiopia's elections in 1995 were the opposite of a democratic proc-
ess since opponents were not allowed to freely compete. 127 It is impera-
tive that Ethiopia abandon this illusion of democracy and create a gov-
ernment that is truly representative of the people. Democratic elections
cannot happen until the constitution is rewritten to eliminate ethnic
118. See The Caravan Passes On: Ethiopia, ECONOMIST, May 6, 1995, at 42.
119. See Haile, supra note 2, at 5.
120. See The Caravan Passes On: Ethiopia, supra note 119, at 42.
121. See Federal Sham: Ethiopia, supra note 110, at 36.
122. See Ethiopia, The Second Most Populous Country in Africa, Offers Many Business
Opportunities for American Firms, BUS. AM., Aug. 1, 1997.
123. See Keith B. Richburg, The More Things Change: Why Africa's New Leaders Are
Like Its Old Ones, NEw REPUBLIC, June 16, 1997.
124. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE ROLE
OF FOREIGN AID IN DEVELOPMENT 13 (1997) [hereinafter FOREIGN AID].
125. See Jeffrey Sachs, It Can Be Done: Growth in Africa, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at
22.
126. See Laura Pawson, Policy to Please Who?, AFR. BUS., Nov. 1996, at 32.
127. See The Caravan Passes On: Ethiopia, supra note 119, at 42.
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boundaries and limit the power of government.128
An ethnically-based federation generally experiences problems not only
on a regional level, but also on a national level. 29 Minority divisions are
created when regional boundaries are drawn based on ethnic groups, and
these minorities have little chance of obtaining political power.130 A
dominant tribal group in a region may exert its pressure for its concerns
to be pursued without regard to the consequences upon the national inter-
est.' 3 This type of domination undermines a democratic approach to
government and it creates a heightened opportunity for ethnic conflicts.
Ethiopia can emulate the approach taken by another African country
to make the transition to a democratic government. South Africa insti-
tuted a lengthy constitutional revision process to ensure that a democratic
government was established. 32 Nelson Mandela and the African National
Congress received pressure to rush headlong into elections before con-
stitutional revisions were completed, yet they resisted. 133 It will take a
similar commitment from Zenawi and the ruling party for advances in
democracy to be made.
Ethiopia's advances in development are also dependent upon a
commitment to a separation of powers. Effective limitations are impera-
tive to keep the government from degenerating into a dictatorship. lThe
imperialistic and socialist rule of the past proved to be detrimental to
Ethiopia's economic and social landscape. Zenawi has a long, tragic his-
tory from which to obtain lessons in governance. The 1995 constitution
did not reflect any lessons learned because it gave the ruling party power
to control the legislature, the executive branch and the judiciary. 135 A
party with such expansive power is almost certain to take advantage of
opportunities to employ unsavory practices. Until this bpportunity for
corruption is eliminated, Ethiopia will continue to experience setbacks in
its progress for sustained development. In the absence of an honest and
capable government, policies may be pursued that actually hinder eco-
nomic development, but benefit those in power.1
36
Is democracy necessary to promote a healthy rate of economic de-
velopment? Some experts do not think so because there is no empirical
link between the two. 137 Where democracy is important, though, is in its
128. See Haile, supra note 2, at 6, 22.
129. See id. at 6.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 7.
132. See Richburg, supra note 124, at 3.
133. See id.
134. See Haile, supra note 2, at 22.
135. See id.
136. See FOREIGN AID, supra note 125, at 22.
137. See id. at 23.
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role of facilitating growth when market liberalization is present.138 A lack
of a strong market has always been an impediment for Ethiopia. The
creation of a true democratic process, combined with integration in the
world economy, is a formula that is certain to create more favorable re-
sults than what Ethiopia has-experienced in the past.
B. Effective Trade Policies
Substantial evidence is available to indicate that the more a country
adopts an externally-focused economic policy, the more likely it is to ex-
perience sustained economic growth and improved social welfare. 9 Ini-
tial steps taken in this direction have the capacity to enhance trade op-
portunities. Ethiopia eliminated price controls and prohibitive regulations
which were stifling market forces when it was moving from a centrally-
planned economy to a free-market economy. 140 Two strategies that
Ethiopia can undertake to move it closer to a prosperous trade policy are:
import substitution and export-led growth. 
141
Import-substitution policies are adopted to spur industrialization by
encouraging production of as many industrial goods as possible. 142 The
goal of such policies is to protect industries from international competi-
tion and encourage both the production and purchase of such items at
home. 143 This type of protection is warranted in developing countries
such as Ethiopia because, otherwise, competition would be too difficult
with established producers from more advanced countries.144
This policy must be carefully monitored to ensure that it does not be-
come counterproductive. High tariffs initially imposed to promote the
policy must be gradually removed to ensure that protected industries do
not gradually become less efficient because they lack competitors. 145 This
inefficiency could have severe consequences. The effects would be three-
fold: goods of inferior quality would be produced at high costs; domestic
prices would increase faster than international prices whereby domestic
currency would be overvalued; and more protection would be applied to
promote growth at home and to restrict domestic demands for imports.146
Ethiopia's past attempt at import substitution was not extremely suc-
cessful. Import substitution contributed to the slow growth of the indus-
trial sector between 1950 and early 1970 despite a dramatic increase in
138. See id. at 24.
139. See id. at 25.
140. See Ethiopia, The Second Most Populous Country in Africa, supra note 123, at 1.
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the number of foreign firms participating in the sector. 147 The government
diversified the range of foreign investors to ensure it retained ultimate
control of the sector.148 The presence of the government made this sector
highly susceptible to corruption. This can ultimately strangle domestic
competition and create a situation where productivity decreases.
49
The second strategy of export-led growth promotes an outward-
oriented focus and a specialization in a more limited range of products. 150
This approach has a tendency to encourage efficient production by do-
mestic companies because they are forced to compete with one another
for international markets. 151 Ethiopia, whose mainstay of the economy is
agriculture, 52 does have a limited range of export products but it has not
employed a strong outward-oriented focus.
Coffee, livestock, hides and skins, and oilseeds are Ethiopia's lead-
ing exports.1 53 Coffee has consistently been the dominant export for the
past four decades. From 1950 to the early 1970's coffee consistently ac-
counted for more than fifty percent of Ethiopia's exports, but accounted
for only two percent of its export earnings. 1 Coffee continued as a chief
export into the late 1980's at the expense of other exports. In this same
period non-coffee exports declined significantly, some as much as sev-
enty-seven percent. The most current data reveals record coffee exports
of approximately 102,000 tons for 1995-96, with a projected 180,000 tons
for 1996-97. t56 Ethiopia can take advantage of this situation by employ-
ing a trade policy that is more outward-oriented.
Ethiopia's trade orientation from 1963 to 1985 was strongly inward-
oriented which favored production for the domestic market.157 This type
of structure can hinder growth in the economy. Studies have shown that
countries with an external-oriented trade and economic strategy attain
higher growth rates than internal-oriented countries. 158 The World Bank
has found that higher growth rates for real gross domestic product (GDP)
resulted from an outward orientation.15
9
Ethiopia's transition to a free-market economy may define future
147. See KELLER, supra note 9, at 109.
148. See id. at 107.
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growth opportunities and enhance its openness to international trade. Pri-
vatization occurred approximately two years ago, but the slow progress
with which economic reform has been introduced produced only marginal
effects. Ethiopia's president, Dr. Negasso Gidada, recently addressed the
Ethiopian Parliament and disclosed that several new and revised eco-
nomic laws would be promulgated during the 1997-1998 session.
160
One bill to be enacted relates to a reorganization of the private sec-
tor. A major feature will be the institutionalization of consultative forums
between the government and the private sector to implement a strategy to
enhance the management and financial capacities of the private sector.16
The bill reveals two possible motives of the government. The feature
could be viewed as a guise to ensure that government involvement con-
tinues in areas where privatization has occurred. The alternative is that
the government is sincere in promoting initiatives to secure the success of
the private sector. Private ownership is a new concept to Ethiopians and
proper guidance is imperative to ensure that benefits of privatization are
recognized in relation to economic development. The President pro-
claimed that all that the private sector needed from the government was
good faith and efficient facilitation. 62 It is questionable whether this
framework will achieve the stated goals. From a historical perspective,
the government's skills in management and financial issues have not been
adept.
A continual commitment to openness must also occur for Ethiopia to
improve its chances of sustained economic growth. Ethiopia must em-
brace the new economic paradigm of globalization by taking action. The
government should strive to establish ambitious growth targets premised
on openness to trade and pursue them by making conditions comfortable
for new domestic and foreign exporters.1
6 3
One step in the right direction is Ethiopia's request to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to become an observer for an initial period to
get to know the rules and practices of the body. 16 4 The WTO is a Geneva-
based organization that (administers)??? (Dan is checking this) the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and its goal is to facilitate quota
and tariff free trading.'6 5 Membership in the WTO would place Ethiopia
in a prime position to promote interest in Ethiopia's markets. WTO has
132 members and ninety percent of the world's trade is conducted among
160. See President Says New Economic Laws to Be Promulgated, ADDIS TRIB., Oct. 24,
1997, at 1.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 2.
163. See Sachs, supra note 126.
164. See President Says New Economic Laws to Be Promulgated, supra note 161.
165. See id.
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member countries. 166 Upon applying for membership, Ethiopia will be
required to modify the current tariff it levies on imports. Ethiopia's tariff
on imported goods is approximately fifty percent, while tariffs imposed
by most member countries on imports is not more than ten percent' 67 It
will at some future point be necessary for Ethiopia to lower its import
barriers, if it intends to open its economy to the World. This reduction in
import barriers is a necessity for Ethiopia to open its economy to the
world. A link to the global economy is vital to Ethiopia's equation for
development.
C. Improvement of Infrastructure
Ethiopia's adverse structural conditions play a smaller role in its
growth shortcomings compared with an open trade strategy. Its role,
though, should not be overlooked because infrastructure integrity is im-
portant in attracting foreign investment. Foreign investors have lined up
to provide infrastructure in telecommunications, port facilities, and
power. 168 Foreign investment in these areas should enable the govern-
ment to concentrate its investment spending in other infrastructure proj-
ects. One such area is the construction of roads. Roads connecting rural
areas to national markets are vital in Ethiopia because export-led growth
can be generated from coffee farmers who live in rural, remote areas.
169
In situations where roads are available, but overburdened, the cost of
transportation can increase; thus decreasing export performance.
Land travel is not the only area that requires governmental interven-
tion. Ethiopia became landlocked in 1993 when Eritrea seceded. 170 Any-
thing that is exported via ship must first reach sea ports either by rail
service or by roadway transportation. An agreement was reached with the
Eritrean govemment for the continued use of ports in Assab and
Massaw.171 Ethiopia also has access to another port outlet in Djibouti, but
goods must first reach the port via very poor rail service.1 72 Anti-
competitive cargo reservation policies and extensive corruption in ports
also threaten to contribute to the weak export performance of Ethiopia.
173
Effective governmental monitoring is the key to addressing this constraint
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related to the infrastructure.
Ethiopia should continue to emphasize education. "A basic level of
education is necessary to have a productive labor force."' 74 There have
been significant increases in budgetary allocations for expanding the edu-
cational system, but the allocations have not been proportional to the
population growth.17 5 It is a challenge to provide educational opportuni-
ties, even at an elementary level, to all Ethiopians. A goal of universal
primary education has been adopted by the government, but achievement
of this goal will take at least two decades to achieve.176 Despite the lack
of instant results of such a policy, Ethiopia should be vigilant in ensuring
that Ethiopians have an opportunity to obtain an education of at least the
elementary level. A hallmark of developing countries that have achieved
sustained economic growth, is that they have made valuable investments
in elementary education. 
177
D. Promotion of Private Sector Investment
Privatization has been briefly discussed, but a more in-depth look at
this topic is warranted. The 1994 Ethiopian constitution placed a huge
obstacle to economic development by placing unreasonable limitations on
the rights of private ownership of property. 17 This type of limitation was
a resurrection of Ethiopia's socialistic past and it proved to be an out-
moded device that the Ethiopian government eventually had to discard.
The International Monetary Fund (MF) and the World Bank (WB)
provided an incentive for Ethiopia to initiate a policy of privatization.
Ethiopia's trade imbalances had consistently left a deficit for which the
IMF and the WB provided relief. Ethiopia's goal of attaining sustained
growth was being undermined by the accumulated debt which it did not
have financial resources to reduce. The IMF and WB presented a pro-
gram of debt cancellation that was contingent upon a fundamental re-
form: Ethiopia's move to private rather than state ownership.
Over the past two years, the Ethiopian government has engaged in a
privatization program which resulted in the sale of approximately 150
state-owned stores, hotels, restaurants, and factories through public ten-
dering. 180 The encouragement of domestic investment can impact eco-
nomic development in profound ways. Ethiopia would not be dependent
on aid from organizations like the IMF and the WB if an increased in-
vestment was made by foreign investors. Foreign investors cannot be at-
174. See FOREIGN AID, supra note 125, at 22-23.
175. See ETHIOPIA, supra note 7, at 2.
176. See id.
177. See FOREIGN AID, supra note 125, at 13.
178. See Haile, supra note 2, at 28.
179. See Ethiopia: Review 1997, supra note 4, at 3.
180. See Ethiopia, The Second Most Populous Country in Africa, supra note 123.
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tracted unless the Ethiopian economy is stable. The economy can be sta-
bilized and strengthened by the private sector, the engine of growth, be-
cause it has a stake in the success of the privatization policy." 1 A suc-
cessful privatization undertaking is essential for another reason: an in-
crease in foreign investment will not be beneficial for sustained growth
unless Ethiopians lay a strong foundation for improving their own eco-
nomic and social well-being.
IV. THE UNrTED STATES' ROLE IN ETHIOPIA'S DEVELOPMENT
A. Investment and Trade Opportunities
The perspective worldwide regarding Ethiopia has changed from that
of charity to one of investment opportunity. Last year Ethiopia passed the
1996 Investment Proclamation which is expected to open additional sec-
tors for investment and lower the initial foreign investment requirement
from $500,000 to $250,000.182 The proclamation creates a multitude of
business opportunities for business firms. There are currently more than
35 American firms represented in Ethiopia. 183 During the first six months
of 1997, 128 American firms sought registered protection for their trade-
marks in Ethiopia.184 Many of these firms currently have subsidiaries in
the capital, Addis Ababa. These active firms include IBM, Boeing, Mack
Truck, General Motors, Pratt and Whitney, and National Cash
Register. 
85
Major projects and contracts are awarded through a bidding process.
An American sugar company recently won an $83 million dollar contract
to build a sugar refinery, and pending projects include: the expansions of
the Addis Ababa International Airport and the Lega Dembi Gold Mine. 8 6
Opportunities in the mineral exploration and extraction sector are
boundless. Ethiopia's substantial mineral wealth includes gold, platinum,
natural gas and petroleum.187 A discovery of a large natural gas reserve in
1996 emphasized the potential for investment in this area. The discovery
occurred in an area known as the Ogaden basin which is considered a
virgin area. 188 American companies in the petroleum industry could
capitalize on this type of situation because they are experienced in im-
plementing projects with advanced technologies on foreign soil. The ex-
181. See Pawson, supra note 127.
182. See Ethiopia, The Second Most Populous Country in Africa, supra note 123.
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traction of these valuable deposits is just one opportunity for Ethiopia to
show the world what it has to offer the global marketplace.
The United States' largest role in enhancing Ethiopia's economic
development comes in the form of increased trade. In 1992, President
Bush added Ethiopia to the list of beneficiary developing countries under
the Generalized System of Preferences 89 because of Ethiopia's develop-
ment of economic reforms. 190 The African market has become increas-
ingly important to the United States because it exports more to Africa
than to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics combined, and
more than one third of United States economic growth results from ex-
ports.191 Recently, a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Re-
lations urged United States policy makers to take advantage of a very
promising period in Africa, as a whole, since the onset of its independ-
ence forty years ago. 192 Legislation introduced in the first session of the
104th Congress may do just that.
B. The African Growth and Opportunity Act
The African Growth and Opportunity Act is intended to promote a
new trade and investment policy for Sub-Saharan Africa. 193 The premise
is to lay the foundation for transition of Sub-Saharan Africa from de-
pendency on foreign assistance to economic self-sufficiency.1 94 An ap-
proach such as this would benefit both the United States and Africa,
through trade and economic development.
The United States policy toward the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa
has historically been based largely on a series of bilateral donor-recipient
aid relationships.1 95 This type of policy has been successful in terms of
providing aid to fight starvation, but it also created a situation, of in-
creased dependence on United States assistance. The policy has been a
contributing factor to stifling economic growth, self-reliance and political
stability for much of Africa. Aid can make a difference in Africa if it is
limited in time and is part of an overall market-driven growth strategy. 1
96
The African Growth and Opportunity Act will promote economic
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growth through private sector activity and trade incentives, and it would
promote continued, economically-focused dialogue between the United
States and Africa. The Act is fashioned to reward African countries that
are moving toward free markets and democracy after years of strife and
poverty. 97-Democracy is slowly returning in Ethiopia, and it stands to
benefit greatly from this Act if democracy takes root. If Ethiopia contin-
ues to liberalize its markets and support privatization, it can change the
perspective with which it is viewed. It can be seen as country with poten-
tial rather than a country that cannot escape a vicious cycle of poverty
and charity.
The bill would encourage the foreign, private sector to take a direct
investment role. This would be achieved through an establishment of a
$650 million dollar fund through the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration; $500 million dollars would be used to guarantee private loads
aimed at improving the infrastructure; and $150 million dollars would be
used to guarantee private equity investments. 98 Both funds are to empha-
size women entrepreneurs and support innovative investment practices
that expand opportunities for women and that maximize employment op-
portunities for the poor.199 This approach may be the catalyst for attract-
ing additional private investment. These investment funds are vital to
Africa's development because only six percent of the 1,160 privately-
financed infrastructure projects around the world occur in Africa.2 °°
Highlights of the act in relation to trade include tariff cuts 201 which
would reduce or remove United States tariffs on approximately 1,800
products in exchange for a reduction by African countries in tariffs on
U.S. goods. 2 This reciprocal trade initiative reduces barriers between
the two countries and promotes dialogue to identify future trade opportu-
nities. This dialogue would be facilitated by one of the bill's initiatives.
The bill would establish a United States/Africa economic forum to meet
annually to foster high-level discussions of bilateral and multilateral trade
and investment policies.20 3 This forum approach is modeled after the fo-
rum between the United States and Asia that has been extremely success-
197. See David S. Cloud, Clinton Unveils Strategy for Africa; Trade Incentives Would
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ful in spurring trade and investment. °4
If the bill becomes law205 the economic payoff may not be recog-
nized for years to come. The U.S. is willing to take such a chance,
though, because of its desire to continually enhance its strength in the
global economy. The bill's chances of becoming law are almost assured
because bipartisan support has been demonstrated throughout the hear-
ings on the bill. The bill received vigorous backing from House Speaker
Newt Gingrich, despite the fact that it was introduced by Democrat, Rep.
Jim McDermott.206 Bipartisan unity such as this is not witnessed fre-
quently. Perhaps overwhelming support is an indicator of the sound
structure that the bill advocates.
C. Initiative's Impact on Ethiopia
The African Growth and Opportunity Act is intended to create a
transitional path from development assistance to economic self-reliance
for African countries that are committed to economic and political re-
form, market incentives, and private sector growth.20 7 Ethiopia's com-
mitment to free-trade, privatization, and economic reform places it in a
good position to reap the benefits of this bill. Acceptance as a participat-
ing country would enable Ethiopia to have enhanced market access, sup-
port for integration, and support for American-African business
relations.2
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The next level of assistance is contingent on Ethiopia's successful
economic reform. 209 This phase involves debt reduction, participation in
the United States/African Economic Cooperation forum, multilateral as-
sistance to support reforms, and support for agricultural market liberali-
zation and trade promotion.210 This type of assistance is imperative to
Ethiopia's march to a stable economy because Ethiopia is a novice when
it comes to dealing in the global market. Ethiopia should ensure that it
does not miss the opportunity to experience the influence of the American
economy because it could prove to be a valuable tool in the long term.
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The key factor in Ethiopia's success in achieving a stable economy is
a continued commitment to not only economic reform, but also to politi-
cal and social reform. The government regimes of the past are constant
reminders of the negative forces that the self-serving governments cre-
ated. Ethiopia has taken steps in the right direction by promoting a demo-
cratic form of government; by privatizing industries once controlled by
the government; by opting for outward-oriented trade policies to enhance
trade opportunities; and by committing money to the improvement of
Ethiopia's infrastructure. Ethiopia must continue to follow through with
these initiatives not only to promote improvement, but also to show the
global market that it is a serious contender.
In early 1997, Ethiopia was added to the United States' 12t" annual
report on "Foreign Trade Barriers" which covers alleged trade
misdeeds. 211 This report is used by the Clinton administration to put na-
tions on notice about areas where the administration is displeased with
their trading practices.212 Ethiopia's inclusion in this report is untimely
considering Congress has been conducting hearings on the African
Growth and Opportunity Act. Ethiopia should eliminate any objection-
able trade practices to ensure that it does not hinder its chances of reaping
the benefits of this United States initiative should it become law.
Ethiopia has endured centuries of strife and it most likely will con-
tinue to do so for some time to come. Complacency, though, is no longer
the norm. Now is the time for Ethiopia to discontinue the paternalistic
aspect of foreign aid which fosters a reactive environment rather than an
active one. Ethiopia must stand on equal footing with its foreign partners
and to promote itself as a serious participant in the global market. The
national anthem of Ethiopia can be said to be the modem cry of Ethiopia:
.-- _ , 213
"March Forward, Dear Mother Ethiopia, Bloom and Flourish.
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